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Few studies have examined the effect of intergroup threat on cognitive outcomes such
as memory. Different theoretical perspectives can inform how intergroup threat should
affect memory for threat-relevant and neutral information, such as the mood-congruency
approach, Yerkes–Dodson law, Easterbrook’s theory, and also evolutionary perspectives.
To test among these, we conducted two experiments to examine how exposure to
intergroup threats affected memory compared to control conditions. In study 1, we
manipulated symbolic threat and examined participants’ memory for threat and neutral
words. In study 2, memory performance was assessed following the induction of realistic
threat. Across the studies, in the control condition participants showed better memory for
threat-related than neutral information. However, participants under threat remembered
neutral information as well as threat-related information. In addition, participants in the
threat condition remembered threat-related information as well as participants in the
control condition. The findings are discussed in terms of automatic vigilance processes
but also the effects of threat on arousal and its effect on information processing. This
latter perspective, suggests paradoxically, that under some circumstances involving
an outgroup threat, non-threatening information about outgroups can be extensively
processed.
Keywords: intergroup threat, vigilance, memory bias, arousal, information
Relations between social groups are often negative, ranging from simple misunderstandings to
extreme forms of violence such as genocide. It is therefore of great importance to understand the
causes of these negative reactions to outgroup members. A great deal of research has gone into this
effort and there is a considerable literature indicating that various factors contribute to negative
intergroup relations. Some of these are: negative prior relations, realistic group conflict, social
identity threat, negative stereotypes, social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism,
ignorance, perceived and actual group differences, lack of empathy, and a host of other conditions.
One factor that has begun to receive greater amounts of attention is perceptions of intergroup threat
(Stephan et al., 2009).
Intergroup threats arise because members of one group (the ingroup) believe that members of
another group (the outgroup) pose threats to their beliefs and values (symbolic threat) or their
material welfare and safety (realistic threats). In previous research, intergroup threats (particularly
intergroup anxiety) have been shown to be related to prejudice toward outgroups (Stephan et al.,
1999), opposition to policies benefiting outgroups (Renfro et al., 2006; Barlow et al., 2010;
Yang and Zhao, 2013), less effective communication with outgroups (Ulrey and Amason, 2001),
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and avoidance of outgroups (Duronto et al., 2005; Barlow et al.,
2010). Some studies have also examined the effects of intergroup
threat on social judgments of outgroups. These findings indicate
that intergroup threat and intergroup anxiety are associated with
judging outgroups as less variable (Hutchison and Rosenthal,
2011), decreased positive stereotyping (Vezzali et al., 2010), and
increased perceptions of the number of work crimes committed
by outgroup members (Pagotto et al., 2010).
In the present research we focus on how intergroup threat
influences memory for information about the outgroup. A focus
on cognitive outcomes such as memory is important because
memory for information, as well as other basic processes such
as categorization and attention, serve as the building blocks for
judgments and decisions. For example, a focus on outcomes such
as stereotyping and judgments of outgroup variability assume
information about an outgroup is available in memory.
In terms of categorization processes, research has shown that
stimuli are more likely to be categorized as representing outgroup
members (especially outgroup males) when those targets emit
signals that can be perceived as threatening, such as a masculine
voice, ambiguous movements, or when they display angry facial
expressions. This is especially likely for individuals who tend to
perceive chronic interpersonal threats (Miller et al., 2010). Other
research has shown that priming self-protectivemotives by having
participants watch a frightening film clip resulted in categorizing
male targets as racial outgroup males, especially for participants
who tended to see the world as a dangerous place (Maner et al.,
2012, Study 3).
Research focusing on attentional outcomes has shown that
certain intergroup-relevant stimuli affect attentional processing.
Trawalter et al. (2008) found that Black compared to White
faces, even when just presented for 30 ms, were more likely
to capture attention. Other research has shown that outgroup
faces (in particular men’s) rapidly capture and hold attention.
Such tendencies have been shown to interact with perceiver
characteristics, for example, a tendency to see the outgroup as
dangerous (Donders et al., 2008; Maner and Miller, 2013).
In terms of memory, research has shown that priming
individuals’ self-protection motives (because of recently activated
thoughts of being a soldier in patrol or by watching amovie where
a person in being stalked) before information encoding, male
and female participants displayed better memory for outgroup
faces (Becker et al., 2010). Similar results have been shown on
memory for angry facial expressions, an effect evinced even under
constrained cognitive capacity (Ackerman et al., 2006).
So when we consider the building blocks of higher-level
judgment and decisions—i.e., categorization processes, attention,
and memory—research has unearthed various findings that point
to a potential role of intergroup threat in shaping basic cognitive
outcomes. When concerned with self-protection, individuals are
more likely to categorize information as threatening, that is, if
we make the reasonable assumption that outgroup males tend to
be perceived as more threatening than other targets. Perceivers
also allocate more attentional processing to such targets and show
better memory for related information. Taken together, these
findings suggest relationships between threat, the outgroup, and
basic cognitive outcomes.
BACKGROUND
The present studies build upon this research foundation. Instead
of focusing on the role of general threats of self-protection,
for example, which could be induced by various circumstances,
we focus on how threats that emanate specifically from the
outgroup influence basic information processing, that is, memory
for information about the outgroup.
When people feel that their group is being threatened by
another group, what effects does this have on memory? This
question is important because it not only reflectswhat information
is the focus of attention during intergroup interactions, but also
what information ingroup members ultimately store and use in
judgments and decisions after having experienced a threatening
intergroup event.
There are a variety of research traditions that are relevant to
formulating hypotheses about the effects of intergroup threat on
memory. The early literature on negative affect and memory
suggested that memory is often skewed in the direction of affect-
consistent information. That is, negative affect leads to greater
memory for negative than positive or neutral information (Blaney,
1986; Mathews and MacLeod, 1994). In the current context, this
literature would argue that intergroup threat should lead to better
recall for negative information such as threat-related information,
than for positive or neutral information—an effect that should
not occur for people who are not threatened. However, there are
a number of studies that suggest that while mood-congruency
effects may occur for some negative emotions (e.g., depression,
disgust), they are not the norm for anxiety related emotions.
Specifically, for anxiety related emotions, the mood-congruency
perspective is quite mixed, at times producing congruency effects
(e.g., Burke and Mathews, 1992; Eysenck and Byrne, 1994),
incongruency effects (Foa et al., 1989; Abalakina-Paap et al.,
2001), null effects (Nugent and Mineka, 1994), or mixed effects
within the same experiment as a function of memory assessed
(explicit, implicit; Mathews et al., 1989). The authors of one
study that found incongruency effects (better recall of positive
information about the outgroup) suggest that at least in their
research, the experience that was induced in participants could
have resulted in modest levels of anxiety (Abalakina-Paap et al.,
2001). Intergroup relations research has shown that modest levels
of uncertainty and anxiety can lead to effective communication
in intergroup contexts (Gudykunst, 1995). Perhaps modest levels
of anxiety, which facilitate communication with outgroups, can
also facilitate memory for information from intergroup contexts
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 2001).
In addition to the influence of affect, some studies of the
Yerkes–Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) have examined
the effects of arousal on memory. Several of these studies
indicate a curvilinear relationship (Deshpande and Kawane, 1982;
Deffenbacher, 1983; Jeong and Biocca, 2012). At low levels
of arousal, memory for all types of information is impeded,
whereas at intermediate levels, memory is maximized. However,
high levels of arousal interfere with cognitive processing and
subsequent memory performance. Thus, the prediction from
this approach would be that all information, both threat-related
and neutral information, would be better remembered under
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moderate levels of arousal than when arousal levels are low
or high. Consistent with this approach, one study found that
moderate negative arousal increased memory for central as well
as peripheral events (Laney et al., 2004). One problem with the
Yerkes–Dodson law, as Deffenbacher (1994) has noted, is that
there is no agreed upon metric that would enable researchers to
pinpoint where on the arousal continuum an individual is.
A third literature that is relevant to predicting memory
following an intergroup threat argues that arousal, in general,
narrows the focus of attention to relevant stimuli (Easterbrook,
1959; McArthur and Solomon, 1978; Burke et al., 1992) and
leads to better memory for relevant than neutral information.
In this case, the relationship between arousal and memory is
linear, the greater the arousal, the better the memory. With
respect to intergroup threat, the implication is that threat-related
information should be better processed and remembered than
neutral information when a threatening situation has created
arousal. When there is no threat, threat-related information
should not be remembered any better than other types of
information.
In the present research we did not induce concerns directly
related to survival, nor was the to-be-processed information
directly relevant to survival. However, the focus on threats to
one’s future prospects (see threats used in the present studies)
are relevant to issues of survival and reproduction, which makes
available evolutionary-based frameworks applicable to the current
theorizing. Different perspectives derived from evolutionary
considerations make somewhat different predictions. Research
interpreted as reflecting automatic vigilance has shown that
individuals display efficient and better processing of negative over
other types of information (Pratto and John, 1991). Research that
has used stimuli more relevant to survival (angry faces) showed
that angry faces were both more quickly and accurately detected
than other faces (e.g., sad faces;Hansen andHansen, 1988;Öhman
et al., 2001), and that biologically-relevant images (sexual images,
appetizing food, snake, skull) held attention longer and were
better remembered than social images even under cognitive strain
(Sakaki et al., 2012). However, research on adaptive memory
suggests that the state of the individual (or at least the task they
are performing) also matters. In incidental learning experiments,
for example, participants who had to evaluate words for their
survival relevance (e.g., securing food, protection from predators)
remembered many more survival-related words than participants
who rated the words for their pleasantness (Nairne et al., 2007).
Thus, in terms of the former perspective (automatic vigilance
to threat), the hypothesis is that memory for threat–relevant
information should be well remembered regardless of the state
(i.e., feeling an intergroup threat) of the individual. Findings
in line with this perspective indicate that faces displaying a
threatening emotion were more readily noticed than happy or
neutral faces (Fox et al., 2000; Eastwood et al., 2001; Pinkham
et al., 2010). Also, in a shooter paradigm, the armed targets were
shot at more quickly than unarmed targets (e.g., Mange et al.,
2012). Threatening information seems potent and salient, as it
may be generally seen as a threat to personal survival, whichmakes
such information preferentially processed over non-threatening
information. But in terms of the adaptive memory perspective,
and also findings linking attention and memory to characteristics
of the person (e.g., seeing the world as dangerous), the hypothesis
differs and suggests that threat-related information should be best
remembered when individuals experience an intergroup threat
compared to individuals who do not.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In order to examine the effects of intergroup threat on memory,
for the present studies we created a design in which participants
were or were not exposed to an intergroup threat. We then
had the participants perform a memory test in which they were
given threat-related and neutral information and later asked to
recognize the information they had seen previously. This allowed
us to determine the effects that intergroup threat had on memory
for threat-related and neutral information. In the first study, the
threats that were activated were symbolic ones (implying that an
outgroup believed the ingroups’ values doomed them to failure).
The second study was a conceptual replication of the first study
in which realistic threats were activated (threats of discrimination
against the participants’ ingroup).
Because the effects of intergroup threat on memory have not
been previously investigated to our knowledge, there is no basis in
prior research on threat that can be used to formulate hypotheses.
However, the other research reviewed offers some reasonably clear
hypotheses. Because we regarded the threat we presented as being
moderate in intensity and because it can be classified as affectively
negative, the mood-congruency approach, Yerkes–Dodson law,
and Easterbrook’s theory that arousal narrows the focus of
attention would suggest that there should be better memory
for threat-related than neutral information after people have
experienced an intergroup threat than when they have not.
However, only the Yerkes–Dodson law would argue that after
an intergroup threat, information that is neutral should be as
well remembered as threat-related information. The automatic
vigilance approach would argue that memory for threat-related
information should always be superior to memory for neutral
information, whereas evolutionary approaches that focus on the
availability of an “adaptive” mindset or evolutionarily relevant
task suggest that superior memory for threat-related information
will depend on individuals experiencing a relevant (intergroup)
threat. Here we assume that the experience of an intergroup
threat, as operationalized in this research, has implications for an
individual’s survival and ability to thrive.
STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The Southwest University (China) Human Research Ethics
Committee approved the present research. All participants
consented to participate prior to the conduct of the research.
Participants and Design
Seventy-three undergraduates from Southwest university
received ¥5 upon completion of the study (46 females, age range:
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19–25). All participants were selected to be low SES (see footnote1
for selection criteria). The study took approximately 10 min to
complete. Threat (symbolic threat vs. control) was manipulated
between-participants; word type (neutral vs. threat) was
manipulated within-participants resulting in a 2  2 mixed
design. Thirty-eight participants were run in the symbolic threat
condition and 35 in the control condition.
Materials and Procedure
At the laboratory participants were seated in separate
experimental cubicles. All participants were informed that
they would be taking part in an experiment in which the
ostensible link between memory and calculation ability would be
examined.
Threat manipulation
First, all participants were asked to read an article. Participants
in the symbolic threat condition read an article, ostensibly
taken from South Weekend—an influential newspaper in China.
The article reported a story indicating that high socioeconomic
status Chinese citizens consider it a waste of time for low
socioeconomic members of society to go to university because
it is difficult to change their status and position in life. In
China, the government does not prevent low SES individuals from
going to university. Actually, they encourage the participation
of low SES individuals in different ways. Thus, the reported
story was a direct affront on low SES individuals’ value and
the belief that they can improve themselves through hard
work. Participants in the control condition read an article
that described the geographic location of Fujian Province.
When reading the article, the participants were asked to
single out specific words in the article. To ensure participants
read the articles carefully, they were asked to check on a
subsequent list whether 10 test words had appeared in the
articles.
After reading the article, the participants completed a
measure that assayed the degree of threat and negative affect
experienced following the reading of the passage. This served
as the manipulation check on experienced threat. For this
1Family socioeconomic status selection measure: we developed a 5-item
measure to assess family SES, including parents’ education and profession
as well as family’s monthly income. We used parent instead of student
information because college students typically are not financially independent
and will therefore have a status based on their upbringing in their family’s
household (Åslund et al., 2009; Henry, 2009). Among 7 contiguous categories
ranging from 1, little or no literacy; 2, primary school; 3, middle school; 4, high
school; 5, junior college; 6, undergraduate; 7, postgraduate, participants chose
one on behalf of their father or mother’ education—the one with the highest
education level. Then they responded to a question on parents’ occupation.
Participants selected from 1, unemployed/migrant worker/temporary
worker; 2, manual worker; 3, skilled worker; 4, office worker; 5, common
managerial/technical personnel; 6, middle-level managerial/technical
personnel; 7, high-level managerial/technical personnel. Participants also
responded to “What do you estimate your parents’ combined monthly income
to be?” with a choice of 7 options ranging from 1= under ¥600, to 7= ¥12000
or over. The options were scaled in increments of ¥1200 (e.g., ¥600–¥1799,
¥1800–¥2999) up to ¥2999, beyond which the scaling changed to increments
of ¥3000. The median response was 4 = ¥3000–¥6000. Participants were
categorized as low SES if there total score was less than 10 (Henry, 2009).
participants completed a 6-item measure answered on 8-
point scales running from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
The items included: threatened, angry, afraid, worried,
irritated, and anxious. The items were averaged to create a
composite index ( = 0.88), with higher scores representing
the experience of greater threat and negative emotional
responses.
Following the manipulation check, all participants completed a
word memory task consisting of encoding, filler, and recognition
phases. In the encoding phase, all participants were presented
40 words (20 neutral words, 20 threat-related words), one at
a time in a random sequence at the center of a computer
screen. After a fixation point appeared at the center of the
screen for 500 ms, the target word was presented at the same
location for 2 s, and the presentation continued until all the
words were presented. In addition, we added two words at the
beginning and at the end of the sequence to reduce primacy
and recency effects. After the encoding phase, all participants
were told to complete a mathematical calculation task for 3-
min to clear working memory. Participants then completed
the recognition phase, in which they saw the original 40
words in addition to 40 new words (20 neutral words, 20
threat-related words). At the center of the screen, the words
appeared one at a time in random order and participants had to
indicate if they had previously seen each word. The next word
appeared immediately on the screen once the participant keyed
a response.
The target and foil words had been previously pre-tested to
ensure equivalence in valence. Pre-test participants used 7-point
scales that ran from 0 (completely not threatening) to 6 (completely
threatening). They also rated the words’ familiarity on 7-point
scales running from 0 (completely unfamiliar) to 6 (completely
familiar). A paired-samples t-test confirmed that the threat words
were rated as more threatening (M = 3.51, SD = 1.28) than the
neutral words (M = 0.81, SD= 0.80), t(18)= 6.81, p< 0.001. The
familiarity of the neutral (M = 3.80, SD= 1.03) and threat words
(M = 3.72, SD= 0.92) did not differ, t(10) = 0.45, p> 0.05.
After completing the recognition phase of the task, participants
were thanked, compensated, and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check: Responses to Passages
An independent-samples t-test performed on participants’
responses to the passages indicated a significant difference
between conditions. Confirming the manipulation of threat,
participants in the symbolic threat condition reported more
negative affect (M = 3.75, SD = 1.47) than those in the control
condition (M = 1.71, SD = 1.46), t(71) = 5.94, p < 0.001,
!2 = 0.332.
Memory Bias
Using a signal detection framework, we calculated
recognition sensitivity (d0) for neutral words and threat
words separately. Recognition sensitivity values were:
d0 = Z(hit rates)   Z(false alarm rates). Hit rates were calculated
by dividing the number of recognized old words by the total
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FIGURE 1 | Mean recognition sensitivity (d0) across groups, Study 1.
number of old words, while false alarm rates were calculated by
dividing the number of errors on new words by the total number
of new words.
The memory data (d0) were analyzed using ANOVA. The
analysis yielded a main effect of word type, F(1,71) = 9.00,
p = 0.004, !2 = 0.113, as participants recognized more threat
words (M = 1.90, SD = 0.60) than neutral words (M = 1.64,
SD = 0.74). More importantly, there was a significant threat
condition  word type interaction, F(1,71) = 4.38, p = 0.04,
!2 = 0.058. As depicted in Figure 1, simple comparisons
indicated that participants who read the control article
showed superior recognition for threat words (M = 1.88,
SD = 0.56) relative to neutral words (M = 1.43, SD = 0.81),
F(1,34) = 14.01, p = 001, !2 = 0.292. However, participants
in the symbolic intergroup threat condition recognized
threat words (M = 1.91, SD = 0.64) and neutral words
(M = 1.83, SD = 0.63) equally well, F(1,37) = 0.39, p = 0.54,
!2 = 0.01. Further, there was a significant difference between
conditions in the degree to which participants recognized the
neutral words [threat condition (M = 1.83, SD = 0.63) and
control condition (M = 1.43, SD = 0.81), F(1,71) = 5.67,
p = 0.02, !2 = 0.074]. No other effects were reliable,
F(1,71)= 0.057, n.s.
Study 1 findings indicated that control participants showed
sensitivity to threat-related words, similar to findings reported
by other investigators (e.g., Hansen and Hansen, 1988; Pinkham
et al., 2010). Specifically, they demonstrated better memory
for threat compared to neutral words. However, participants in
the threat condition recognized all of the words—both threat-
related and neutral ones—equally well. Also, participants
in the threat condition recognized more neutral words
than control participants. From the different theoretical
perspectives discussed in the introduction, it appears that only
the Yerkes–Dodson account—given moderate levels of arousal
that were presumably induced by the intergroup threat—would
predict extensive processing for both the threat-related and
neutral information under intergroup threat. However, to
increase our confidence in these results, we conducted Study 2 to
conceptually replicate Study 1 using a different type of intergroup
threat.
STUDY 2
Materials and Methods
Participants and Design
Seventy-four undergraduates from Southwest University
participated in the study and were given ¥5 upon completion
of the study (42 females, age range: 18–26). All consented to
participate in the study. As in Study 1, we selected participants
to be low SES (see footnote 1 for selection procedure). The
study took approximately 10 min to complete. Participants were
assigned to either the realistic threat group (n= 39) or the control
group (n = 35). Word type (neutral vs. threat) was manipulated
within participants.
Materials and Procedure
The word stimuli and procedure were identical to those in Study
1, except that participants in the threat condition were presented
with an article designed to induce realistic intergroup threat
(see footnote2 for pilot test results confirming the difference
between the symbolic and realistic threat content in the articles
used in the studies). Recall that all of the participants were low
SES, so in this study realistic intergroup threat was induced
by having participants read a report describing how citizens of
high socioeconomic status were more likely to obtain educational
resources and would generally find it easier to get a better paying
job compared to people of low SES. The control passage was the
same one from Study 1. Following the reading of the assigned
passage, participants responded to the manipulation check as in
Study 1 ( = 0.92). Then they completed the memory task, were
thanked, compensated, and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check: Responses to Passages
An independent-samples t-test performed on participants’
responses to the passages indicated a significant difference
between conditions. Confirming the threat manipulation,
participants in the realistic intergroup threat condition reported
more threat and negative affect (M = 4.02, SD= 1.25) than those
in the control condition (M = 1.64, SD = 1.49), t(72) = 7.46,
p< 0.001, !2 = 0.436.
2To ensure that the symbolic intergroup threat article was related to symbolic
threat rather than realistic threat, and that the realistic intergroup threat article
was related to realistic threat rather than symbolic threat, we conducted a
pretest with 20 participants who were given definitions for both symbolic and
realistic intergroup threat. Then they read the two articles and rated the two
articles on how related they were to the two types of threat on scales that
ran from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). The paired-sample t-test showed
that the symbolic intergroup threat article was rated more related to symbolic
threat (M = 5.05, SD = 1.45) than realistic threat (M = 2.95, SD = 1.50),
t(19) = 4.27, p < 0.001. The realistic intergroup threat article was rated as
more related to realistic threat (M = 4.10, SD = 1.29) than symbolic threat
(M = 2.60, SD = 1.79), t(19) = 2.48, p = 0.023. At the same time, the
symbolic intergroup threat article was rated as more related to symbolic threat
(M = 5.05, SD= 1.45) than the realistic threat article (M = 2.60, SD= 1.79),
t(19) = 4.85, p < 0.001. The realistic intergroup threat article was rated as
more related to realistic threat (M= 4.10, SD= 1.29) than the symbolic threat
article (M = 2.95, SD= 1.50), t(19)= 2.21, p= 0.039.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 17595
Zhu et al. Information Processing Under Intergroup Threat
FIGURE 2 | Mean recognition sensitivity (d0) across groups, Study 2.
Memory Bias
Using the signal detection approach, we calculated the recognition
sensitivity (d0) for the threat-related and neutral words as done in
Study 1, and the memory data (d0) were analyzed using a mixed
design ANOVA. The analysis yielded a main effect of word type,
F(1,72) = 13.70, p < 0.001, !2 = 0.160, with participants better
recognizing threat words (M = 2.11, SD = 0.66) than neutral
words (M = 1.81, SD = 0.75). Of greater interest, there was a
threat conditionword type interaction, F(1,72)= 4.24, p= 0.04,
!2= 0.056. As depicted in Figure 2, simple comparisons indicated
that participants who read the control article showed superior
recognition for threat words (M = 2.11, SD = 0.63) relative to
neutral words (M = 1.63, SD= 0.71), F(1,34)= 16.49, p< 0.001,
!2= 0.327. However, participants in the realistic intergroup threat
condition recognized threat words (M = 2.10, SD = 0.69) and
neutral words (M = 1.96, SD= 0.77) equally well, F(1,38)= 1.37,
p = 0.250, !2 = 0.035. Further, there was a marginally significant
difference between conditions in the recognition of neutral words
[threat condition (M = 1.96, SD = 0.77) and control condition
(M = 1.63, SD = 0.71), F(1,72) = 3.67, p = 0.059 (two-tail),
!2 = 0.048]. No other effects were reliable.
The findings from Study 2 conceptually replicated those of
Study 1 using a manipulation of realistic intergroup threat. The
basic type of mental processing under realistic intergroup threat
appears to be the same as that induced by symbolic intergroup
threat in terms of the encoding and recognition of previously
processed information. Taken together, the results of the two
studies strongly support the conclusion that individuals who are
made to experience an intergroup threat will not only process
threat-related information well but neutral information too.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the current research we used a signal detection approach,
which leverages people’s ability to accurately recognize previously
presented information (Green and Swets, 1966; Foa et al., 2000).
The results showed that participants in the control condition
better remembered threat compared to neutral words, while
participants in an intergroup threat condition remembered
neutral words to the same degree as threat words. The use of signal
detection helps show—with good fidelity—that participants did
not discriminate between the threat andneutral informationwhen
the two types of information were processed under a threatening
context.
The findings for the control condition demonstrating better
memory for threat-related than neutral information are consistent
with an automatic vigilance perspective, which argues that people
are generally vigilant with respect to threat-related information.
In most situations, negative information is taken to suggest an
impending threat to the individual (e.g., survival, identity, beliefs
about one’s prospects), so it makes sense that such vigilance
occurs even when people are not feeling directly threatened by
their construal of the broader situation and circumstances (cf.
Pratto and John, 1991). Related research has shown, for example,
that individuals not under threatening circumstances nevertheless
rapidly orient to and pay greater attention to male outgroup
faces (Trawalter et al., 2008), although some research indicates
this is more likely for those who associate Blacks with danger
(Donders et al., 2008). Many threats in the natural environment
in which humans evolved would have occurred when people were
not feeling threatened, but for survival purposes such threats did
need to be attended to. The findings for the general memory
advantage of threat-related information thus do not accord with
evolutionary perspectives on adaptive memory effects directly
linked to the “mindset” (such as one involving survival) induced
in individuals (Nairne et al., 2007). In the present studies, under
control conditions, threat-related information was preferentially
processed.
Additional evidence against the latter, evolutionary perspective
comes from comparisons of memory for threat-related informa-
tion between the intergroup threat and control conditions, that
is, if we assume that under intergroup threat more of a “survival”
mindset is active in participants. In both studies, intergroup threat
did not increase memory for threat-related information. Further,
the obtained findings are not as would have been predicted
by the Yerkes–Dodson law or Easterbrook’s attention narrowing
hypothesis. Since the participants did rate the threats as arousing,
there should have been enough arousal to improve memory
for threat-related information. Instead, threat-related information
was well processed and remembered, regardless of whether or not
the participants’ were feeling threatened.
In terms of the groups studied in this research (disadvantaged
ones, although this factor was not varied in these studies), the
suggestion is that low SES individuals may be chronically sensitive
to SES-related information that poses a threat to their group.
With respect to intergroup relations more generally, the findings
suggest that there is a memory bias that may complicate matters.
By attending to and remembering threat-related information,
even in the absence of any current threat, people may build on
their fears and negative expectations of outgroups.
Perhaps the most important finding in these studies was that
under both symbolic and realistic threat there was no difference
in the recognition of threat-related and neutral information. That
is, not only did intergroup threats lead to high levels of memory
for threat-related information, they also increased memory for
neutral information. This finding is consistent only with the
Yerkes–Dodson law. It suggests that the arousal created in this
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study was sufficient to improve memory for neutral information.
This finding, though, does not fit with Easterbrook’s idea that
arousal leads to a narrowing of attention to relevant stimuli since
arousal-produced narrowing of attention should have led to poor
memory for neutral information in the threat condition. It also
does not fit with evolutionary accounts of adaptive memory
that rely on activation of a relevant (e.g., survival) mindset
(Nairne et al., 2007) because there is little value in recalling
neutral information. Finally, these results are inconsistent with a
mood priming account because any negative affect in the threat
condition should not have facilitated the processing of neutral
information.
There is a study in the arousal/memory literature that has
obtained results that are conceptually similar to those obtained
in the present studies, which suggests our findings are not an
anomaly. In that study it was found that exposure to faces
displaying fear (versus faces displaying neutral information) led to
better memory for neutral information that was paired with fear
faces than for neutral information paired with neutral faces (Davis
et al., 2011).
The present studies leave unanswered the question of what
the effects of threats that create high arousal would be. It is
possible that at high levels of threat there would be decrements
in cognitive processing. Consistent with this reasoning, two
studies suggest that high levels of threat-related arousal may
cause cognitive decrements. In these studies participants’ arousal
was increased by inducing experiences that made them feel
angry, which should have been highly arousing. In one study
participants were more likely to misidentify neutral objects as
threatening when they were angry than when they were not angry
(Baumann andDeSteno, 2010). In the other study, anger increased
mistaken judgments that target individuals possessed guns when
they did not (Unkelbach et al., 2008). It would also be valuable
to know if executive functioning is undermined by threats
that create high levels of arousal. In particular, would people
rely more on intergroup cognitive heuristics (e.g., stereotypes,
the ultimate attribution error, misanthropic memory, stereotype
disconfirmation bias) under high levels of arousing threat because
they require fewer cognitive resources?
The finding that both neutral and threat-relevant information
are well remembered when individuals experienced an intergroup
threat has potentially important implications in applied settings
that would be valuable to pursue in future research. For instance,
this finding suggests that when intergroup threats producemodest
levels of arousal people may attend to information in intergroup
settings that they might otherwise not attend to or remember.
This non-threat related information could be important because it
could serve to humanize and individualize outgroupmembers and
consequently influence intergroup perceptions such as the infra-
humanization of outgroups and perceptions of the variability
among outgroup members. That is, along with the negative
effects of intergroup threat (e.g., increasing prejudice, avoidance,
etc.), it is possible that intergroup threats just might have
some potentially positive effects on information processing. Only
additional research can answer these questions.
The present research is not without limitations. First, our
manipulation-checks only used negative and not positive
affect labels. It could be argued that this could have primed
all participants with negative affective states (despite mean
differences in reports), which could have increased sensitivity to
threat-related words in both the intergroup threat and control
conditions. However, it is important to point out that such
an alternative cannot fully explain the pattern of results, i.e.,
the difference in the processing of the neutral words. Second,
although in the present studies we used control conditions,
it would have been useful to use a manipulation of negative
affect such as anxiety (that did not involve threat), or a non-
intergroup threat manipulation involving, for example, general
self-protection. The memory patterns in such conditions would
allow us to more accurately pinpoint the nature of the differences
discovered in the present research. For example, if after a
negative affect (anxiety) induction the memory patterns were
found to be dissimilar to the intergroup threat conditions, our
conclusions could more strongly speak to the role of intergroup
threat versus anxiety in information processing. In addition, a
non-intergroup threat condition would allow us to state with
greater confidence that intergroup threat per se, and not just
any threat, is what is driving the present findings. Finally,
and related to the threats used in this research, a limitation
is that the threats were focused at the group level, but in the
intergroup threat literature a distinction is made between
threats that are aimed at the ingroup as a whole and threats
that are aimed at individuals because they are members of this
group (Davis and Stephan, 2011). In fact, Davis and Stephan
found that individual and group threats had different effects on
emotions. Group threats produce more anger than fear whereas
individual threats had the opposite effect. It would be interesting
to see if the pattern of results that were found in the present
studies will extend to threats that are more individualized.
Assuming a moderately strong covariation between fear and
anxiety (e.g., Sarnoff and Zimbardo, 1961), the group versus
individualized threat distinctions could also help tease out
the effect of anxiety in the processing of intergroup-related
information.
CONCLUSION
Different research findings point to relations among threat,
intergroup perception, and basic cognitive processing. But to
our knowledge the present research provides the first memory
evidence concerning how people process threat-related and
neutral information under intergroup threat. The results revealed
that participants, regardless of condition, remember threat-related
information well, which we argue stems from such information
always being important and personally relevant. But intergroup
threat, whether it was of a symbolic or realistic nature, also
increasedmemory for neutral information apparently because the
arousal created by threat improves the cognitive processing of such
information.
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